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Software is a potentially excludable public good. It is possible, at some cost,
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ture of the software while licensing it under the GPL artiﬁcially makes of it a pure
public good. A project leader will prefer one or the other of those license terms
depending on her software project’s market potential and on the cost of developing
it. The optimal licensing for a sequence of cumulative innovations and the impact
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1Open-source development methods have attracted academic interest in recent years
because of their apparently counter-intuitive economic characteristics and because of
their spread beyond software development to many other areas. Online communities
and other group communication mechanisms often function on open source principles.
Independent news websites (blogs) have emerged as an alternative to established news
media. Online databases that can be openly edited by anybody (wikis) generate alter-
native repositories of knowledge. Genetic research, among other research areas, has
beneﬁted from the use of open source methods. This paper will concentrate on the
speciﬁc example of open-source software development but holds lessons for the orga-
nization of any of those various open-source community efforts.
Deﬁnitions Software development is generally protected by copyright. Copyright is
the right to prevent others from using, modifying or selling your intellectual production
without your permission. A copyright holder can then grant users a license underlining
the rules under which they will be allowed to use, reproduce, distribute or modify the
software.
Software can be licensed under three broad classes of licenses. It may have a pro-
prietary license, be distributed under the rules of the Berkeley Software Distribution
(“BSD”), or have a General Public License (“GPL”) attached. The software may also
be public domain and is then not protected by copyright. www.opensource.org
provides a listing of other licenses but for the purpose of this paper, all licenses can be
tallied up to one of those three groups of licenses. They are deﬁned below:
If the original code was released under proprietary license terms, a modiﬁcation to
it will be under the copyright of the original author of the software. The author of the
modiﬁcation cannot claim copyright on the modiﬁed program. If the original code was
under BSD license terms, a person who contributes code will have the copyright on
her contribution and she can release that contribution under proprietary license terms.
2However, the original code remains under the copyright of the original licensor. If the
original code was released under GPL license terms, a person who contributes code
will have the copyright on her contribution but she must release that contribution under
the GPL. In other terms, she must copyleft her copyright. Finally, any work that is into
the public domain cannot be copyrighted, although copyright on a modiﬁed version
can be claimed. Choosing a BSD license is not equivalent to releasing the source code
into the public domain because under the BSD the project leader keeps the copyright
on the part of the software she developed herself.
Motivation This paper is partly motivated by a long-standing controversy in the
open-source (‘OS’) community between supporters of the Berkeley Software Distribu-
tion (‘BSD’) ‘open-source’ license and supporters of General Public License (‘GPL’)
‘free software’. On the one hand stand Bruce Perens and Eric Raymond of the Open
Source Initiative (www.opensource.org), on the other Richard Stallman and par-
ticipants in the development of the GNU/Linux operating system (www.fsf.org).
GPL proponents want the code to be free; the source code of a software must always
be available to all. BSD proponents want developers to be free; developers must be
able to do what they want with the code, including making it proprietary, and thus not
free in the GPL sense. GPL proponents think the BSD threatens the spirit of collabora-
tion between free source developers because it allows the integration of BSD code into
commercial, proprietary software. BSD supporters think the GPL unduly limits the do-
main of application for open-source software by discouraging participation and use by
commercial software companies. GPL proponents argue that using the GPL helps dis-
couraging the fragmentation of development teams into competing options (‘forking’).
The BSD on the other hand is alleged to lead to dissensions and distrust between devel-
opers as everyone fears somebody else will exploit the collective work in a proprietary
version of the software. Faced with such potential lawsuits, BSD developers may then
3prefer developing individually and not sharing their code rather than contributing to a
public good that may then be appropriated by others. BSD supporters reply that com-
petition between developers trying to produce commercially viable software induces a
dynamic development process that leads to the development of software that is better
suited to users’ needs than GPL software generally is.
Modeling This paper takes the point of view of a developer with a software project.
She will be called a project leader. She has the choice between three types of licenses,
the BSD, the GPL and the proprietary license and she can draw on a pool of devel-
opers to develop her project. The project leader’s licensing decision will determine
whether developers will want to participate in the project and for what motives. This
will inﬂuence the dynamics of the software development – how many developers will
join the development team, whether there will there be competing development teams
(‘forking’) and whether developers will release their work for free or instead make it
proprietary (‘hijacking’). The choice of the project leader will be determined by the ex-
pected size of the market for the software, the cost of developing the software, the cost
of making the software proprietary, marketing it and protecting it from unauthorised
copy and ﬁnally by the intrinsic value of the software project.
An example of the dilemma facing the project leader in its choice of license terms
is the case of Netscape which in 1998 released its web browser under an open-source
license. The Mozilla Organization (www.mozilla.org) was set up to coordinate
open-source work on the project. Netscape initially imposed the Netscape Public Li-
cense on the code, which would have allowed Netscape, and Netscape only, to use
parts of Mozilla, the open source version of Netscape, in proprietary versions of the
software. Faced with the unwillingness of developers to contribute under those condi-
tions, Netscape had to change its license to a variant of the GPL, the Mozilla Public
License.
4Literature This paper is related to three different strands in the economic literature:
papers exploring systems for the private provision of discrete public goods, papers
trying to establish the optimal licensing schemes for sequences of innovations, and
case studies examining the functioning of open-source software projects.
Private provision of public goods The title of this paper is a wordplay on an ar-
ticle by Justin Pappas Johnson, “Open Source Software: Private Provision of a Public
Good” (Johnson (2002)). That article focused on the GPL license terms. The present
paper points out that the GPL is only one speciﬁc open source software license, de-
signed so as to minimize free riding, forking and hijacking in the development of a
public good. This paper thus focuses on the other major open source license, the BSD.
This licensing scheme may lead to the public development of a private good: a BSD
licensed software may end up being made proprietary, even if it was the product of
joint public development effort. One then has to wonder why a project leader would
choose such a licensing scheme rather than using copyright law to impose either the
GPL or a proprietary license on her project. The study of the BSD license terms proves
more complicated than that of the GPL and this paper thus simpliﬁes Johnson (2002)
by assuming the cost and the value of development is the same for every developers.
However, from that simpliﬁcation, the paper introduces both the forking and devel-
opment hijacking problem by assuming innovations take place over many periods in
additive increments. The paper also introduces competition between software projects.
The model is also inspired by Varian (2004), from which it borrows some modeling
techniques and a simpliﬁed version of a speciﬁc production rule, the one where the
value of the public good is determined by the individual who contributed the “best
effort” into its production. That production rule is particularly well ﬁt to software
production; there is usually one best way to develop a feature and there is no point
including two ways to implement the same function into the same software.
5Bergstrom, Blume, and Varian (1986) discusses private provision of public goods
and, closer to this paper, Palfrey and Rosenthal (1984) discusses the private provision
of discrete public goods. The present paper is not however a simple application of
models of public good production to open source software; this would amount to com-
paring proprietary and public domain software. This paper is a study of the relatively
recent original systems of public good production that operate under two main type of
licenses, the GPL license terms and the BSD license terms. Choosing an open-source
license leaves an innovator open to expropriation but broadens the pool of expertise she
can draw from. This is a dilemma that is analyzed in Hellmann and Perotti (2004): the
innovator must choose between keeping her idea in a ﬁrm or openly circulating it and
sharing it with others.
Optimal licensing schemes This paper is not the ﬁrst to underline the organi-
zational consequences of the choice of an open source license. Other papers do exist
that relate the choice of a speciﬁc open-source license term to the characteristics and
dynamics of the development of that software. von Hippel and von Krogh (2003), for
example, underlines the organizational consequences of the mix of private and collec-
tive motivations in open source innovation. Lerner and Tirole (2005b) is a preliminary,
survey based study of the determinants of open source license choices. The article
shows that projects that are oriented toward the needs of developers will more often
be licensed under non-restrictive license terms (BSD) than projects oriented toward the
needs of consumers who have limited programming abilities. Projects that could be
proﬁtably exploited on the market are thus generally licensed under the GPL. Projects
that are oriented toward developers on the other hand do not need such protection be-
cause the beneﬁt of making the software proprietary is limited: developers will ﬁnd it
easy to use the open-source version instead of the proprietary version, and there is only
a limited prize to making the software proprietary as the market for it is limited.
6Lerner and Tirole (2005b) also ﬁnds that projects with unrestricted license terms
attract more contributors. Fershtman and Gandal (2005), which like Lerner and Ti-
role (2005b) is based on a survey of the Sourceforge open-source projects database
(www.sourceforge.net), ﬁnds that projects with restrictive license terms will at-
tract lower value individual contributions than projects with liberal license terms. The
authors explain that contributors to a GPL project value the signaling aspect of a con-
tribution to the project (being included in the list of contributors brings about prestige
and better career opportunities for a developer). Contributors will thus contribute only
up to what is needed to be listed among the development team. Contributors to a BSD
project on the other hand will have another set of motivations that is not available to
GPL developers: the prospect of making the software proprietary and exploiting pro-
prietary versions derived from it. They will thus contribute up to the point where the
software ﬁts their needs.
Lerner and Tirole (2005a) offers a review of the actors’ strategies in open source.
They review papers such as Gaudeul (2005a) which compares the performances of
volunteer and for proﬁt organization in software production. Mustonen (2005) is an-
other work that studies the interaction and co-existence of various license schemes in a
software application domain.
Thefunctioningofopen-sourcesoftwareprojects Thepresenttheoreticalstudy
of license terms choice is directly inspired by the (L A)TEX case study (Gaudeul (2003a),
Gaudeul (2003b), Gaudeul (2005b)), as well as by the observation of the differing orga-
nizationaldynamicsofseveralopen-sourcedevelopmentprojects. Unlikemostprojects
that were previously analyzed in the open-source literature, TEX (www.tug.org)
adopted a BSD-type license (The (L A)TEX Project Public License). Its license is there-
fore similar to Apache, a web server, and to BSD-Unix, an operating system. Pro-
prietary versions of TEX were thus released over time and came in direct competi-
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software thus differed in important ways from the development of the GPL licensed
Linux operating system (www.linux.org). Another example of a BSD software
whose logic of development was very different from that of Linux is BSD-Unix. There
was fragmentation in the development of BSD-Unix, with various versions dealing
with the specialized needs of a fraction of the original users of the software (FreeBSD
(www.freebsd.org) for networking, OpenBSD (www.openbsd.org) for secu-
rity, NetBSD (www.netbsd.org) for portability). Forking was more limited in
the Linux project. BSD Unix was almost killed off by the threat of proprietary re-
appropriationofitscodebyAT&T.SomeofthedevelopersofUnixworkedforAT&T’s
Bell Labs. This led USL, the assignee of AT&T’s rights to Unix, to assert in 1993 that
some parts of the various BSD versions of Unix were its property. A successor to USL,
SCO (www.sco.com), renewed that type of claim in 2003 by asserting it owned the
rights on all Unix software designed for Intel processors. The ensuing legal battles and
uncertainties gave much of the impetus behind the development of the better protected
GPL licensed Linux operating system. www.levenez.com/unix represents the
development and forking history of Unix based systems, and Gaudeul (2005b) presents
a similar time line of the development of the (L A)TEX typesetting system.
Organization of the paper In the ﬁrst part, one project leader wants to develop one
innovation, chooses her license and then chooses how many developers to include in
her development team. Parameters that determine the choice of the developer between
the proprietary, BSD and GPL license terms, are deﬁned. In the second part, several
innovations must be realized successively over time. Equivalently, there is a devel-
opment programme which mandates that features be developed on top of each other.
More simply, development may not occur in one go and developers build the software
based on what was done by others before them; the development is the product of a
8joint effort spread over time. The dynamics of development of the BSD and the GPL
are compared. The third part examines the competitive setting; there is more than one
project leader and the project leaders compete to attract developers to their team. The
conclusion summarizes and discusses the main results of the paper.
1 The model
An individual (the project leader or ‘PL’) owns the copyright on a software project.
The project consists of a sequence of innovations (features) f ∈ {1,...,F}. Features
must be developed in strict succession, one after the other (cumulative innovations),
in the order of their ranking in the set {1,...,F}. F is a function of how close to
completion the software is when the PL asks for assistance, and is also a function of the
complexity of the software. Each feature has the same value v to the M consumers, to
thedevelopersandtotheprojectleader. v representstheusagevalueofthesoftware. M
represents the level of interest in the software in the wider, non-developer community.
Mv is thus the market value of the software. There is a pool of developers who can
develop the software at cost c. c is the opportunity cost to developing the software.
c0 is the cost to make a feature proprietary, it is the cost of setting up a proprietary
organization that will protect the software from unauthorized copying and that will
market the software.
v − c (1)
is thus the net private value of the software to a developer, while
Mv − c0 (2)
is its net market value.
9Assumption 1 Mv − c0 ≥ 0
This paper focuses on the case where the software to be developed is commercially
viable. If Mv − c0 < 0 then the software is never made proprietary because the in-
vestment c0 in making it so is more than the gain Mv from selling the product on the
market.
The game proceeds in several stages and is repeated as long as the project is not
developed. Suppose feature f ∈ {1,...,F} was developed last period, and f < F. In
this period, the PL wants to get feature f +1 developed. The game is played according
to the following sequence:
1. The project leader decides on the license terms to be applied to the code that
embodies the sequence of innovation {1,...,f}. The license can be BSD, GPL
or proprietary.
2. The project leader distributes the source code to n developers under the license
chosen in stage 1. Developers are indexed by i ∈ [1,n] = N.
3. Developer i chooses ai = (0,1), with ai = 1 if i develops the feature and ai = 0
else. Developers do not observe the choice of other agents in the set N, but they
know they all have the same cost of effort c, value for the feature v, as well
as cost c0 to make the feature proprietary. They also all know M the size of
the market. Denote si the (possibly mixed) strategy of developer i. The vector
A = [a1,a2,...,an] is realized.
4. TheprobabilitythefeatureisdevelopedisP(F(A))withF(A) = max
ai
[a1,a2,...,an]
and P(1) = 1 while P(0) = 0. This means that even if there is only one devel-
oper i such that ai = 1, the feature is developed with probability 1. There are no
synergies between developers.
105. Deﬁne N0 = {i ∈ N / ai = 1}. Developers in the subset N0 ⊂ N observe
other members of N0 and decide whether to incur cost c0 to make their feature
proprietary. Denote c0
i = (0,1) developer i’s choice, with 1 denoting the choice
to incur expense c0. This determines a subset N00 ⊂ N0 = {i ∈ N0 / c0
i = 1}.
6. Developers in N00 set prices pi, i ∈ N00 for their feature.
7. Consumers observe the vector of prices P = (pi)i∈N00 and choose from whom
to buy the feature.
8. If feature f + 1 was not developed in this period, then the game moves to the
next period until the feature is developed. The per-period discount factor is δ.
9. If feature f + 1 was developed this period, then the game moves to the next
feature, f + 2 to be developed, or if f + 1 = F, the game ﬁnishes. The discount
factor from feature to feature is ρ.
δ is a function of the dynamism and efﬁciency of the open-source community and
of the ease of contacting developers there. δ will be assumed to be zero in most of the
paper. This can be interpreted as meaning that if developers that were ﬁrst contacted
chose not to develop the software, none later will. This can also mean that the idea for
development is revealed only once to one or many developers, and will not circulate
afterwards through a sequence of developers until developed.
ρ is a function of how easy it is to integrate, publish and circulate new features in
the software. It is necessary for this to happen before development can move to the
next feature.
The project leader can be interpreted as being an idea generator or a person with
the charisma to direct the development of the software. She has got the blueprint for
the software to be developed and she decides on the sequence of features/ideas to be
developed. c is the investment to be put into each idea for their value to be realized.
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incur that investment c herself, in which case she owns the idea and can sell it to
others. However, it costs her c0 to protect her copyright (proprietary license terms).
She can also release the idea to a chosen set of developers and ask that they release
its implementation for free (GPL license terms). Finally, the project leader can let any
developer who implemented the idea exploit it freely. That developer is then free to
sell the completed product/idea/feature to others, provided it expends cost c0 to protect
its copyright (BSD license terms).
Note that the project developer can limit the team size. She can ﬁlter whom to ac-
cept contributions from. This is a reasonable assumption even though it goes counter to
the myth of open source communities being open to all contributions. OS development
teams can in fact choose whether to be closed or open, that decision not necessarily be-
ing the decision of one person – it can be the result of a collective decision. This is the
case for example of the Apache webserver development team, where developers have
to go through several stages to become able to modify the Apache code more and more
freely. The functioning of the Apache Software Foundation is explained in for example
Hann, Roberts, Slaughter, and Fielding (2004). While a project leader will ﬁrst wonder
how to get developers to work on her project, she will soon become concerned, if her
project is successful, about how to manage the stream of contributions and maintain a
good, collaborative ambiance for development. This means open source organization
are frequently designed primarily to screen and ﬁlter contributions (von Krogh, Spaeth,
and Lakhani 2003).
122 When to choose the BSD license and the hijacking
problem
Consider the case where δ = 0 and F = 1. There is one feature to be developed and
there is only one round of development.
Proprietary license terms Suppose the project leader chooses proprietary li-
cense terms. When the software is developed, the project leader will sell her software
at price p = v, the value of the software, to every M potential users of the software.
She will incur cost c to develop the software and cost c0 to make it proprietary.
Lemma 1 If the proprietary license terms are chosen, the project leader sells the de-
veloped software at price p = v. The project leader’s utility is ΠP = (M+1)v−c−c0.
Proof. The project leader maximizes proﬁt
ΠP = Mp + v − c − c0 (3)
s.t.
v − p ≥ 0 (4)
Proﬁt is the market price of the software times the number of buyers plus the private
utility of the software to the PL minus cost of development c and the organizational
cost c0 of choosing a proprietary license. The constraint ensures consumers buy the
software. It will be saturated so that p = v.
GPL license terms Suppose the software is licensed under the GPL. Once the
software is developed, its price is 0 because the license prohibits the software being
made proprietary.1 Suppose a developer is chosen into the set N of those n developers
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develops the software with probability 1; if she didn’t, then the software would never
be developed. If n > 1 and v −c > 0, then a developer will attempt to free ride on the
effort of another developer by adopting a mixed strategy and working with probability
less than one. The overall probability the software is developed is then less than one. If
v −c < 0, then no developer works on the software. This brings the following lemma:
Lemma 2 If the GPL license terms are chosen, δ = 0 and F = 1, the project leader
discloses the code to one agent. The agent works with probability x = 1 for c < v and
x = 0 for c ≥ v. The price of the software is 0. The project leader’s expected utility is
ΠGPL = xv.
Proof. A general proof for any δ ≥ 0 is provided in appendix A.
BSD license terms Suppose now the project leader chooses the BSD license
terms. In that case, developers are more motivated to work than in the GPL case:
They bet on the possibility that they will be the only one to develop the software and to
be able to exploit a monopoly on the software. Unlike in the GPL case, therefore, the
project leader will not want to disclose the software to only one developer each period.
That developer would have a monopoly on the software if she developed it. She would
then be able to sell it at price p = v and derive total net proﬁt Mv − c0 + v − c ≥ 0
from its development. The PL’s utility would be v − p = 0, which is less than what
she would get by developing the software herself under proprietary license terms. The
project leader therefore chooses to release the code to more than one developer each
period, so as to, with positive probability, not have to pay for the software. Indeed,
if two developers or more developed the software, it is not possible for any of them
to make any proﬁt by making the software proprietary. If one did so and set a price
such that she made positive proﬁt, another would make its own software proprietary
14and undercut the price of the ﬁrst. Denote xn the probability a developer works when
Card(N) = n.
Lemma 3 If the BSD license terms are chosen, δ = 0 and F = 1, the project leader
discloses the code to n = 2 agents. The price of the software will be p = v if only
one developer develops the software, 0 else. The probability a developer develops the
software is x2 = 1 for c ≤ v, x2 = Mv−c
0+v−c
Mv−c0 for c ∈ [v,(M +1)v −c0] and x2 = 0
for c ≥ (M + 1)v − c0. Proﬁt for the PL is ΠBSD = x2
2v.
Proof. See proof in appendix B. Sudipto Bhattacharya proved a similar type of
result in an auction setting (see Spatt (1988)).
Note how the results differ from those in the GPL case: for v ≥ c, even though
the PL discloses the code to two agents at once, they both develop it with probability
one whereas if the code had been released under the GPL, each developer would have
developed the code with probability less than one. This is because under the GPL, if
one agent develops the software, it must release it for free to others. If two developers
are contacted, then they will try to free-ride on each other’s effort. Under the BSD
on the other hand, agents know that if they do not work and the other agent develops
the software, the other agent will sell it at price v. The alternative to working is thus
0 and they therefore both work with probability one when v ≥ c. Note that if the PL
had contacted three agents, then each agent would work with probability less than one.
Indeed, they would bet on the possibility that the two other agents develop the software
and it thus be released for free. The alternative to working would then be x2
3v > 0 so
that x3 < 1. Therefore, n = 2 is optimal for v ≥ c as well as for v ≤ c.
The results also differ from the GPL results for v ≤ c : in that case, the software
would not be developed under the GPL as the private incentives for development would
not be sufﬁcient. However, since Mv − c0 > 0 (assumption 1), a developer may
work on the software in the hope that net expense v − c will be recouped by selling
15the software and getting its market value. However, each developer will work with
probability x2 < 1 because, unlike in the case where v ≥ c, the beneﬁt of working is
not always positive: if the other developed the software as well, then each developer
makes a loss of v − c.
The choice of the project leader The comparison between the BSD, the GPL and
the proprietary license terms can now be made. The GPL is equivalent to the BSD
for any v ≥ c as under both licenses development will occur with probability one and
the PL’s utility will be v. Note however that the BSD requires that two developers be
contacted while the GPL needs only one. This difference will be discussed later in
the article. The BSD will be preferred to the GPL for any v ≤ c as the GPL is not
feasible in that range. For v ≤ c, the BSD may be preferred to the proprietary license
terms when x2
2v the PL’s utility under the BSD is more than Mv −c0 +v −c, its proﬁt
under proprietary license terms. As x2 goes to zero when Mv − c0 diminishes, the
proprietary license terms will become preferred for Mv − c0 low. If Mv − c0 is high,
then the proprietary licenses become preferred too, as proprietary proﬁt increases while
BSD proﬁts cannot go higher than v. It is therefore for intermediate values of Mv −c0
that the BSD will be preferred to proprietary license terms.
Proposition 1 The BSD license terms will be chosen when s.t. v ∈ [4











v)]. The GPL or the BSD will be chosen s.t. c ≤ v
and Mv − c0 ≤ c.
Proof. Proﬁt under the proprietary license terms is ΠP = Mv + v − c − c0 for
Mv + v − c − c0 ≥ 0, 0 else. Proﬁt under the BSD is ΠBSD = v for c ≤ v,
ΠBSD = v[Mv+v−c−c
0
Mv−c0 ]2 for c ∈ [v,(M +1)v −c0] and ΠBSD = 0 else. Proﬁt under
the GPL is ΠGPL = v for c ≤ v, 0 else. Straightforward calculation obtains the result.
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v)] for v ∈ [4
5c,c] and
when Mv − c0 ≥ c when c ≤ v.
This part underlined the conﬂict of interest between the project leader’s ideal li-
censetermsandwhatdevelopersprefer. DevelopersprefertheBSDtotheGPLbecause
the BSD allows them to commercialize the result of their work on the software. Users
prefer the GPL as it guarantees the software will be available for free. The project
leader is indifferent between the GPL and the BSD whenever both are feasible. Un-
der the GPL, she will get any implementation for free while the BSD could allow for
a proprietary exploitation of the BSD software that would carry a positive price. By
exploiting competition between developers, the PL can get the software for free even
when it is under the BSD, and this with probability one whenever v ≥ c.
For v ≤ c, developers working under the GPL would lack the motivation to work
on the software because there is no way to commercially exploit it. The PL may there-
fore choose the BSD license term as this will enhance developers’ incentives. The PL
contacts many developers at once in the hope of generating competition between them
and thus lowering the probability the resulting development is made proprietary and
carries a positive price. However, as the prospect of competition with other developers
lowers developers’ incentive to work on the software, the PL will still choose to limit
the number of developers in the development team.
Asforproprietarylicenseterms, theyensuredevelopmentoccursbecausetheproject
leader is in control of development. However, higher organizational costs (cost of pro-
tecting the work, of hiring developers and of monitoring them) may lead her to choose
an open-source license as an easy way out of the complications of commercial licens-
ing.
A practical conclusion from this part is that the ratio between the cost of develop-
ment c and the value of the software v may be lower in GPL than in BSD or proprietary
17projects.2 The GPL will be chosen in areas where a small effort brings big rewards.
This is the case of less innovative software development areas, such as projects that
consist in reverse engineering existing proprietary software. Linux is a good example,
as it was originally a UNIX clone which got progressively improved into a viable al-
ternative to the Microsoft Windows system. The BSD-Unix system, on the other hand,
was developed from scratch by academics.
From this part too, the number of contributors in a BSD projects (the PL and two
developers) should be higher than in GPL projects (the PL and one developer), which
itself should be higher than in proprietary projects (the PL develops alone). This can
be interpreted in several ways: this can mean that the process of development will be
more competitive in BSD projects than in GPL or proprietary projects (as competition
is what guarantees that development can keep being done in an open source way). It
can also mean that a project leader will choose the BSD only in areas that will attract a
lot of interest by developers, while the GPL will be chosen in areas where there is less
prospect of an healthy competition between developers. Lerner and Tirole (2005b) do
indeed ﬁnd that the higher the value of the software to the users compared to its value
to the developers, the more restrictive the license terms will be.
As the potential market for a software project increases, BSD or proprietary license
terms will become more frequently used. It is indeed quite seldom that OS applica-
tions are user-oriented rather than developer oriented, and most software with an user
orientation are proprietary. The Lerner and Tirole (2005b)’s study would seem to con-
tradict this ﬁnding (the GPL is more frequently used the higher the project’s value to
end-users) but that study also asserts that the BSD is more frequently used the higher
the project’s value to developers. That study also does not include proprietary software
in its sampling since it was based on an OS repository. Verifying the predictions from
the present model would require building a fully representative sample of software in
an application domain. This is a project I am currently leading.
183 Streams of innovations and forking
The previous part considered there was only one task to be performed. However, soft-
ware development is generally an incremental process; developers use each other’s
work to develop increasingly sophisticated products. This part considers the dynamics
of incremental development.
Suppose thus that there are two tasks to be performed successively (F = 2). In
each period, a task f is allocated to n developers. The two tasks are assigned in suc-
cession; task 2 cannot be performed if task 1 was not performed. Developers observe
the outcome of the previous development rounds and they know how many develop-
ment rounds there are.
In such a setting, the PL faces the risk that the whole project may be appropriated
in the ﬁrst phase of development, which may make her less willing to choose the BSD.
That fear is irrelevant in the case of the GPL and the proprietary license terms as
each feature is developed with probability one each period and the development thus
progresses unimpeded. In the BSD case, it is only when the two developers developed
the feature 1 that OS development will be able to proceed to feature 2. Indeed, in
that case, both developers release the code embodying feature 1 to the community un-
der the BSD since none gained an advantage over the other. When only one developed
feature 1, then she will make it proprietary and it will not be possible for other develop-
ers to proceed further in developing the software. Open-source development will stop
because there are no sufﬁcient incentives to replicate the existing proprietary feature
open-source: it would cost c to develop which is less than v, its private value, and since
a proprietary version already exists, there is no perspective of making a proprietary
exploitation of it. Finally, if no developer developed the software, then development
stops. Once a developer gained an advantage on others and made its software propri-
etary, she will keep developing the software in a proprietary way and appropriate sur-
19plus from feature 2 as well. This means the developers are more motivated to develop
the ﬁrst feature than the second. Indeed, the sooner the software is made proprietary,
the higher the reward as the possibility to exploit the sale of future improvements is
also acquired.
The following proposition shows that the higher the number of features to develop,
the more advantageous the BSD becomes. The project leader may be putting the whole
project at risk of early proprietary hijacking, but the probability of early hijacking
becomes lower as the project becomes more complex. Developers are indeed more
motivated to develop feature 1 rather than feature 2, which means that hijacking will
occur more often in the later stage of development (2) than in the early phase (1).
Proposition 2 ThePL’sutilityfromchoosingtheBSDincreasesastheprojectbecomes
more complex (F increases) because this increases the chances the project will keep
being developed under the BSD rather than hijacked. The PL’s utility is ΠBSD =
(x0
2)2(1 + ρx2
2)v with x2 = 1 + v−c
Mv−c0 and x0






for c ∈ [v,Mv + v − c − c0].
x2 is the probability the second feature is developed, and is the same as in the case
where F = 1 as there is only one feature left to develop. x0
2 is the probability the
ﬁrst feature is developed, and is higher than x2 as developers’ proﬁt from hijacking is
higher when 2 features are left to develop than when only one is.
Proof. In appendix C. This can be generalized to a stream of innovation for any
F > 2.
In this simple model, once a developer gained an advantage at one stage in the
development process, that advantage is irreversible and OS development cannot go on.
In a more complex model, the open-source version may keep being developed in the
hope that at some point it might catch up again with the proprietary project and become
potentially marketable. The BSD main line of development would then coexist with
20more advanced proprietary versions of the BSD software. This is what happened for
example in the case of the BSD TEX typesetting software. However, in the present
setting, the developer who gained an advantage at some point develops the following
features in succession with probability one in each period so there is no possibility to
catch up.3
GPLed innovations will cumulate without forking or appropriation by others, while
BSD development runs the risk of being hijacked and thus stopped as soon as it is made
proprietary. Does this make the GPL preferable to the BSD? The BSD does as good
a job as the GPL whenever the GPL is feasible. Indeed, there is no risk of hijacking
for v ≥ c because the PL contacts two developers and both developers work with
probability one, ensuring the resulting work is contributed back under the BSD. The
BSD may lead to forking when v ≤ c but the GPL would not have been possible under
those conditions anyway.
It was assumed that when two developers developed a feature at the same time,
they would contribute them back to the common pool and development would keep
on from there as if only one version of the feature existed. This supposes developers
are able to agree on which version is best, or can reconcile differing versions easily.
That may not correspond to reality as ego motivations come into account. Technical
disagreements and small differences in the implementation of the same function can
also be important. The two versions may then keep on being developed independently,
which would substantiate the critique made by GPL proponents: the GPL would be
preferable to the BSD whenever both are feasible because it prevents development
fragmentation. The advantage of the GPL would be that its development does not rely
on competition between developers for its success.
However, there might be a beneﬁt to fragmentation; competing development teams
that work on related versions of BSD software might beneﬁt from each other’s work.
21Fragmentation may be seen as wasteful replication of effort but in fact competition
between projects can improve the resulting software, as participants in the projects will
try to overtake and improve on each other, possibly borrowing the best from each other.
This was certainly what happened in the parallel development of the different strands
of BSD Unix as development teams frequently and openly borrowed each other’s best
features.
Since this part ends up introducing competition issues into the development of BSD
software, the next part examines what happens when several projects are put into com-
petition.
4 Competition between projects
Consider two project leaders (“PL”) with two projects that are perfect substitutes. The
ﬁrst PL, PL1, ﬁrst chooses the license terms under which her code will be developed,
contactsn1 developerswhowillworkundertheconditionsitchose, andobtains(ornot)
a product. The second PL, PL2, having observed that choice, and its result, chooses
her own license terms and n2. The chronology of the development of each project is
unchanged from that exposed in part 1. Assume that δ = 0 and F = 1.
This part examines which license terms PL2 will choose in response to the choice
of PL1 and how competition changes the choices of the project leaders.
Lemma 4 If the ﬁrst project leader chooses proprietary license terms, then she will
face no competition, open-source or otherwise. The price of her software will be p =
min[c,v] and the project leader’s utility will be ΠP = Mp + v − c − c0.
Proof. First note that whether the second PL releases its software under the GPL
or the BSD, the incentives of the developers will be the same since when development
22occurs, the price p for both software will be lowered to 0 as the two products are perfect
substitutes. The choice of the GPL or the BSD is therefore indifferent as developers’
incentives are limited to their private value for the software. The ﬁrst PL will choose
her price knowing the second PL will release her code under an open-source license
or buy her own product. Suppose v ≥ c. A developer who works gets v − c while
if she doesn’t work she gets max[v − p,0] so that the ﬁrst developer can sell only if
v − p ≥ v − c or p ≤ c. By maximization of proﬁt, she sets p = c. If c > v, the
proprietary software developer sets p = v and then neither the BSD or the GPL open-
source product will get developed. Indeed, the GPL is not feasible, while the incentives
to develop the BSD software are reduced to private incentive v − c so that the BSD is
not feasible either.
This lemma precludes not only the emergence of a proprietary alternative to the
ﬁrst PL’s software, but also of any open-source alternative. That the second PL doesn’t
want to develop her product under proprietary license terms if the ﬁrst develops her
own product is not surprising, as indeed competition would reduce prices to 0. Since
price p = min[c,v], she will rather buy PL1’s software rather than developing her own
project herself and incur development cost c. What is more surprising is that the second
PL is not tempted to release her code under either the GPL or the BSD, even though
that would produce an alternative to PL1’s proprietary software and reduce its price
to 0 at no cost to the second PL. This is not done because the ﬁrst PL anticipates that
action and will set her price p equal to c so that even if an alternative OS project was
launched, its developers are indifferent between working on the OS product (cost c) or
buying the proprietary product (price c)
The only change from the monopoly case is for c < v; competition reduces the
price of the proprietary product to c instead of v. For c > v, the ﬁrst PL can act as a
monopolist.
23Consider now the case where the ﬁrst PL chooses an open-source license. When the
ﬁrst PL chooses the GPL, then there is no point for the second project leader launching
her project since the ﬁrst one will be made available for free to her. The same holds
if the ﬁrst PL chooses the BSD and v ≥ c. Now, if the ﬁrst PL chooses the BSD and
v ≤ c, then the second project leader may choose to launch her project if the feature
developed in the ﬁrst project is made proprietary. However, no one will be motivated
to work on it since the feature will be sold at price p = v whereas developing the
software again would cost c ≥ v. The second project leader will then choose to launch
her own project only if development of the ﬁrst project was not achieved. This has
an ambiguous effect for PL1: on the one hand, developers in the ﬁrst project will be
tempted to free ride on the effort of developers in the second project. On the other
hand, PL1 will beneﬁt if the second project is successful and is kept BSD as she will
then get it for free. The following lemma shows that competition will always make the
BSD more attractive to a project leader.
Lemma 5 If the ﬁrst project leader chooses open-source license terms, then its project
will have no competition. GPL proﬁt is unchanged from the monopoly case. BSD proﬁt
for the ﬁrst PL is ΠBSD = (x0
2)2v +(1−x0
2)2x2








Mv−c0], s.t. c ∈ [v,(M + 1)v − c0]. This is more than proﬁt in
the monopoly case.
x0
2 denotes the probability a developer works on the ﬁrst project and x2 the proba-
bility a developer works in the second project. x2 is as in the monopoly case, while x0
2
will be less than in the monopoly case since there is free-riding by the developers. The
PL’s proﬁt is ΠBSD = x02
2 v + (1 − x0
2)2x2
2v : development of the ﬁrst project is made
by both developers with probability x02
2 and released for free. If none work (probability
(1−x0
2)2), then the second project may be developed and released under the BSD with
probability x2
2. As long as the BSD is chosen by PL2, x2 is high enough for x0
2 never
to get so low that the net effect be negative.
24Proof. The proof is in appendix D. The proof can be generalized to a stream of
competitors: Since PL1 welcomes competition for her project, PL2 will welcome
competition to her project as well, and so on ad inﬁnitum. The condition for com-
petition to be welcomed only depends on the relationship between x0
2 and x2, which
remains the same as in the lemma.
It is now possible to state the following proposition:
Proposition 3 Competition reduces proﬁts for a proprietary licensor, does not change
proﬁts for a GPL licensor and increases proﬁts for a BSD licensor. Competition thus
makes open-source licenses more attractive.
Proof. From lemma 6 and 7 and because p, the price of a proprietary software,
decreases compared to the monopoly case in order to deter potential competition. Since
GPL proﬁt is unchanged, the range where open source licenses are used is clearly
broadened when v ≥ c while it is also broadened for v ≤ c as PL1’s BSD proﬁts is
increased by competition.
As explained in lemma 5, the proprietary license terms are still used even in front
of a potential open-source equivalent. When the project leader chooses a proprietary
software license, she must lower her price so as to deter the development of an alter-
native open-source software. The potential availability of an open-source alternative
doesn’t make the use of proprietary license terms disappear. The proprietary license
may however be used less often in application ﬁelds that are very competitive than
in application ﬁelds where competition is limited. However, if used, the proprietary
software will have only limited OS competition. More generally, GPL and proprietary
software will generally gain a monopoly in their domain of application (the ﬁrst project
wins), while the history of BSD software will be more complex: Several BSD projects
may be launched in succession and abort until one is successful. BSD contributions
will be dispersed over many projects and many projects will die out. This is borne by
25the example of how competing set of macros were built on top of TEX under the lead-
ership of different individuals, with only one (Leslie Lamport’s L ATEX) remaining in
the end as less popular projects died out. Many strands of development competed over
time, died out or were sometime integrated into the most successful of the alternative
development projects (see Gaudeul (2005b)). GPL development on the other hand will
appear to be less chaotic.
5 Conclusion
The BSD expands the range of projects that can be developed open-source. It will gen-
erally not be chosen in cases where the GPL might have been chosen had the BSD not
existed. The BSD and the GPL are therefore not substitutes but rather complements.
This ﬁnding takes the edge from the GPL vs. BSD controversy, and also deﬁnes in
precise terms how BSD software will differ from GPL software. GPL proponents’
fears of proprietary hijacking of BSD software are justiﬁed, but the paper shows this
is a conscious risk taken by the PL. She will mitigate the risk of seeing the project
hijacked into proprietary versions by contacting many developers at once so there be a
high probability competing proprietary versions exist and the price be lowered. Fork-
ing will happen more often in BSD projects than in GPL ones but paradoxically, BSD
license terms become more and more attractive as a project becomes more and more
complex and farther from completion. This is because the probability there is forking
is very low at the beginning of the project as developers strive to be the ﬁrst to make
the project proprietary and appropriate it at an early stage. They thus keep each other
in check which guarantees that forking will occur only seldom in the early stages of de-
velopment. There will generally not be competition between GPL, BSD or proprietary
versions of a software; a project leader will choose the optimal license for her software
and subsequent projects in that same domain of application will not take off, whether
26they choose different or the same type of license as the ﬁrst software in the market.
Strong competition will make proprietary licenses less attractive. When the BSD is
chosen, projects may emerge and fail until one is successful or made proprietary while
GPL software development will be less uncertain.
Future work would concentrate on the robustness of the results; what happens if
the production function is changed, when for example there are synergies between de-
velopers (team work), or when the OS organization can generate a system of reward
and punishment for developers. The literature on public goods, notably on the motiva-
tions of contributors in an experimental setting, also shows that contributors have other
motivation than their mere individual interests. The paper assumed there was only one
possible way to develop the software project, while in reality, even close versions of
the same OS product differ in some respect and ﬁt subtly different needs. The paper
could explicitly make a difference between the value of the software to developers and
to consumers instead of assuming it is the same to both, so as to determine the effect
of the user-orientation or developer-orientation of the software as in Lerner and Tirole
(2005b). A proprietary version of a software and its OS version were assumed to be
equivalent as long as they included the same features. In reality, there are impedi-
ments to the direct use of an OS software by lay-users while proprietary software is
frequently easier to use. This is why consumers may prefer proprietary software even
if it is functionally equivalent to its OS version (Gaudeul (2005a)).
Finally, as the paper predicts development teams will be larger in BSD software
than in GPL software (as in BSD software developers prefer to be many so as to lessen
the risk the development is hijacked, or, in an alternative explanation, the BSD is cho-
sen in development areas that attract many developers), the leadership and management
style of BSD and GPL projects may differ. BSD organizations may need to follow a
collegial decision process while GPL organizations would be more likely to be directed
from the top under the authority of one leader. This is because BSD developers have
27a higher ‘out’ option than GPL developers, so that the way a decision on development
is reached might need to be more consensual. Systematic comparison of the way GPL
and BSD projects function could conﬁrm this intuition. For example, while there is an
undisputed leader in the development of the GPL Linux operating system, the develop-
ment of the BSD Apache server is managed through committees and consultation with
a broad array of developers.
Notes 1Indeed, the software cannot be sold without its source code being included in the product. The ﬁrst
buyer will thus become a competitor to the ﬁrst seller and after the ﬁrst sale price will thus drop to 0 through
competitive pressure. Every agent will wait for another to buy the software as long as the ﬁrst seller sets
a price more than 0, so that the equilibrium price p is 0. This line of reasoning is similar to the Coase
conjecture for the pricing of durable goods. A simpler justiﬁcation for the 0 price is that the GPL prohibits
selling the software being sold at more than a nominal price covering distribution costs.
2This is not equivalent to saying that work will be divided into smaller chunks in GPL development than
in BSD or proprietary development or to saying that the cycle of releases in GPL software is faster than in
BSD software and yet faster than in proprietary software (Evidence from Fershtman and Gandal (2005) is
that GPL developers make smaller individual contributions than BSD developers). Indeed, this presumably
reduces both c and v in parallel.
3The OS strand of BSD development may also keep on because some consumers prefer the OS version
even if it is less advanced, but the incentives of OS developers are nonetheless reduced by the coexistence
with the proprietary version.
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A GPL license terms
Lemma 6 If the GPL license terms are chosen, δ ≥ 0 and F = 1, the project leader
discloses the code to one agent every period until the project is developed. The agent
works with probability x = 1 for c < (1 − δ)v, x = 1−δ
δ
v−c
c for c ∈ [(1 − δ)v,v],
x = 0 for c ≥ v. The price of the software is 0. The project leader’s expected utility is
ΠGPL = xv
1−(1−x)δ.
Proof. Denote si the strategy by developer i in N. Consider the mixed strategy si
which consists in choosing ai = 1 with probability xi. The expected probability the
software is developed is then
E(P(F(a1,...,an))) = 1 − (1 − x1)(1 − x2)...(1 − xn) (5)







Consider only symmetric equilibria of this game and denote sn the optimal symmetric
strategy when there are n developers, xn the probability each developer will work un-
der sn and qn = 1 − xn. b si the best response to (s1,...,si−1,si+1,...,sn) is deﬁned
by
b xi = max
xi
{xi(v − c) + (1 − xi)[(1 − qn−1







v − c is the net utility of working. (1 − qn−1






nv is the utility of not
working: (1 − qn−1
n )v is the probability another developer in this period develops the
software times v, its private value. qn−1
n is the probability no developer works this






discounted expected utility as n developers will be contacted each period. Maximiza-
tion in xi shows that
v − c = (1 − qn−1















v − c = (1 − qn−1







Proﬁt is the private utility of the software to the PL times the probability the software
is developed each period, 1 − qn
n, discounted by qn
nδ each period.
From the constraint in the maximization program above, qn is determined by the
equality
cqn
nδ + v(1 − δ)qn−1
n − c = 0
31The derivative of the above with respect to n is also equal to 0 so that we have:
(cnqn−1
n δ + v(1 − δ)(n − 1)qn−2
n )∂qn + (cqn
n lnqnδ + v(1 − δ)qn−1
n lnqn)∂n = 0
n(cqn




− v(1 − δ)qn−2
n ∂qn + clnqn∂n = 0
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n − v(1 − δ)qn−2
n > 0 (11)
But
c = v
(1 − δ)(1 − xn)n−1
1 − (1 − xn)nδ
so that (11) can be rewritten as
n ≥ 1 − qn
nδ
which is true for any n ≥ 1 as δ ≤ 1. Therefore, qn is always decreasing with n.
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knowing (11), the sign of the above is the sign of
(1 − δ)qn−1
n v(1 − δ)qn−1
n lnqn (12)
whichisnegative,sothattheproﬁtfunctionisalwaysdecreasingwithnandtheoptimal




1 − (1 − x1)δ
v
with x1 = 1−δ
δ
v−c
c for c ∈ [(1 − δ)v,v], x1 = 1 for c ≤ (1 − δ)v and x1 = 0 for
c ≥ v.
For c low enough, a developer will work on the project with probability one, so that
there is no need to release the code to more than one developer. When c increases, a
developer may want to rely on another developer to do the work, either in this period
(which can happen if n > 1) or in the next period. The developer then chooses a mixed
strategy and works with probability xn, dependent on n. xn decreases as the number
of developers who were contacted increases. As n increases, xn decreases so fast that
1 − (1 − xn)n, the probability that the software is developed by at least one developer
among n, decreases too: The incentives for developers to free-ride always over-ride the
beneﬁt from having a larger team size so that the optimal n is equal to 1. For c ≥ v,
the beneﬁt of developing the software is lower than its development cost, so that the
software is not developed.
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Denote si the strategy by developer i in N. Consider the strategy si which consists in
choosing ai = 1 with probability xi. The expected probability the software is devel-
oped is then
E(P(F(a1,...,an))) = 1 − (1 − x1)(1 − x2)...(1 − xn) (13)
Theexpectedprobabilityonlyonedeveloperdevelopsthesoftware(Card(N0) > 1)
is





In that case the developer is a monopoly and sets price p for her software.
The probability that more than one developer develops the software (Card(N0) >
1) is
E(P(F(a1,...,an))/∃ i,j s.t. ai = aj = 1) (15)
= E(P(F(a1,...,an))) − E(P(F(a1,...,an))/∃!i s.t. ai = 1)
(16)
In that case, the developers have equivalent software. If more than one made the
software proprietary, Card(N00) > 1 and price is driven to 0. If only one makes it
proprietary (Card(N00) = 1), then it must set its price such that another is not tempted
to make its software proprietary as well, which means its expected proﬁt is 0. Assume
therefore that if Card( N0) > 1 then Card( N00) = 0, i.e. if more than one developed
the software, none make it proprietary (alternatively, we could assume that p is set such
that Mp = c0 which ensures proﬁt from making the software proprietary is 0).






n). Consider only symmetric equilibria of this game
and denote sn the optimal strategy when there are n developers, n > 1, xn the proba-
bility an individual developer works under that strategy and qn = 1 − xn. b si the best
response to (s1,...,si−1,si+1,...,sn) is deﬁned by
b xi = max
xi
xi(qn−1
n (Mp + v − c0) + (1 − qn−1
n )v − c) (17)
+ (1 − xi)[µ(n − 1,xn)v + (n − 1)xnqn−2
n (v − p)] (18)
µ(n,xn) = 1 − nxn(1 − xn)n−1 − (1 − xn)n is the probability that the software
is developed, and this by more than one developer, when the code is released to n




n the developer is the only one to have worked on the software,
she then has a monopoly on the software, makes it proprietary and will sell it at price
p to the M consumers). If she doesn’t work, she gets the software for free when more
than one among the remaining n − 1 developers developed the software.
Maximization in xi shows that
qn−1
n (Mp+v−c0)+(1−qn−1
n )v−c = µ(n−1,xn)v+(n−1)xnqn−2
n (v−p) (19)
The project leader thus maximizes proﬁt
ΠBSD = µ(n,xn)v + nxnqn−1
n (v − p) (20)
s.t.
qn−1
n (Mp + v − c0) + (1 − qn−1
n )v − c = µ(n − 1,xn)v + (n − 1)xnqn−2
n (v − p)
(21)
v − p ≥ 0 (22)
35The PL’s payoff is the probability the software is developed times the private utility
of the software to the PL minus the price p to be paid if there is only one developer
who developed the software: µ(n,xn)v + nxnqn−1
n (v − p) = qn
nv − nxnqn−1
n p.
The second constraint ensures the PL is ready to pay p, the price asked by a devel-
oper who developed the software.
From the second constraint, v − p = 0 (the developer sets the price just so that the
PL is ready to pay).
Note that proﬁt for the PL is 0 if n = 1 because she will have to pay p = v anytime




n (Mv − c0) + v − c = µ(n − 1,xn)v (25)
with µ(n,xn) = 1 − nxnqn−1
n − qn
n. Let us determine
∂qn
∂n from the constraint,
which can be rewritten
c = qn−1
n [(M − n + 2)v − c0] + qn−2
n (n − 1)v (26)
The derivative of the above expression yields
0 = [(n − 1)qn−2
n ((M − n + 2)v − c0) + (n − 1)(n − 2)qn−3
n v]∂q
+ lnq[qn−1
n [(M − n + 2)v − c0] + qn−2
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which sign is the sign of
q − 1 −




+ lnq × n × (q − 1) − q lnq (32)
= (q − 1)[
c − qn−2





] − q lnq (33)
Assume c − qn−2
n v > 0 (A). Then the sign of the above is the sign of
(q − 1)[c − qn−2
n v − nqn−2
n lnq × v] − q lnq(c − qn−2
n v) (34)
or
(q − 1 − lnq)[c − qn−2
n v] − (q − 1)nqn−2
n lnq × v (35)
which is negative as q − 1 − lnq ≤ 0 for any q ∈ [0,1]. This means that n = 2
and therefore, the condition (A) for the validity of the above is that c − v ≥ 0 which
37is veriﬁed. For c ≤ v, then, and as explained in the main text, the PL contacts 2
developers and they both develop with probability one. Check now that when n = 2,
the expression of x2 and ΠBSD are as in the lemma.
C Streams of innovations
If the PL chooses the GPL or the BSD and v ≥ c, then development occurs with
probability one each period and the project can never be hijacked. The same holds
whenever the proprietary license terms are used. The interesting case is therefore when







0 = (1 − x0
2)(Mv + v − c − c0)(1 + ρ) + x0
2(v − c + ρx2
2v) (38)
0 = (1 − x2)(Mv − c0) + v − c (39)
x0
2 denotes the probability a developer develops feature 1 when 2 developers are se-
lected in the set N, while x2 denotes the probability a developer develops feature 2
when 2 developers are selected in the set N. The optimal decision of the PL is indeed
still to contact two developers each period. The ﬁrst constraint balances not working
and then either having to pay to use the software developed by the other developer
or not having the project developed, vs. working and getting proprietary proﬁts over
the two features when the other developer doesn’t work, or the private value from the
software if the other developer works, plus the discounted value of having the sec-
ond feature potentially released for free. The second constraint is the same as in the
monopoly case.




with x2 = 1 + v−c
Mv−c0 and x0





2v) for c ∈ [v,Mv +
v − c − c0].
Proﬁt under the BSD when F = 2 must be compared to (1+ρ)x2
2v, the discounted
value of getting the two features developed in succession when they are not linked in
a project and thus are developed with probability x2
2 each period. The former will be







2 ≥ x2 which is always the case.
Note that even though the motivations for developers are increased in the ﬁrst stage
of development, there always will be some probability that the software is hijacked in
the ﬁrst stage, i.e. x0
2 < 1 whenever v < c. Also, the condition for x0
2 ≥ 0 is the same
as for x2 ≥ 0 : releasing the whole blue-print for development does not expand the
software feasibility set.
D Competition between projects
Suppose PL1 chooses the GPL and v ≥ c. If PL1 thinks the PL2 will choose n2 = 0,
then she will choose n1 optimally (n1 = 1) and development will occur. n2 = 1 and
n1 = 0 is also an equilibrium of the game. For v ≤ c, the GPL cannot be chosen by
either of the PL.
Suppose now PL1 chooses the BSD and v ≤ c. Suppose PL1 chooses n1 = 2. If the
software is developed by only one developer, then it is made proprietary at price p = v
39and developers contacted by the PL2 will not be motivated to work on the project as
price would then be reduced to 0 and their net proﬁt would be v−c ≤ 0. If the software
is developed by more than one developer, then its price is 0 and there is no point for
the PL2 launching her project. If the software is not developed by any developer then
the second PL will release the code to n2 = 2 developers.
The ﬁrst PL’s proﬁt is then
ΠBSD = (x0
2)2v + (1 − x0
2)2x2
2v (42)
with x2 and x0
2 determined by the following equation for v ≤ c :
(1 − x0
2)(Mv − c0) + v − c = x2
2v (43)
(1 − x2)(Mv − c0) + v − c = 0 (44)
so that x2 = 1 − c−v
Mv−c0 and x0





PL1’s proﬁt is more than proﬁt if there hadn’t been competition if
(x0
























x2 ≥ 0 (48)
But the condition for the BSD to be chosen by PL2 vs. proprietary license terms is
that
x2
2v ≥ b + v − c (49)








which is equivalent to (48). This means that whenever the BSD is chosen by PL2
(who faces no subsequent competition), competition increases proﬁts for PL1 who will
therefore herself also choose the BSD rather than the proprietary license terms.
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